Argon QR Vault (AQRV)

A memory-hard code the size of a SeedQR: one small secret under a passphrase, with Argon2id.

Krux's KEF does the same job with PBKDF2 on microcontrollers, whose few megabytes of memory leave no room for a memory-hard function, and it is a sound choice there. Where a device has the memory, standard practice is a memory-hard function, with Argon2id first among them (RFC 9106; OWASP). AQRV brings that to a code of the same size for computers and Raspberry Pi: a next step for QR vaults on such devices, beside KEF and not in its place.

It is an open proposal seeking outside review. It is not in Faraday's app, has not been reviewed and is not a standard. It is for testing only.

What it is What it holds How it compares Downloads How to help

What it is

One secret, one passphrase, one small code.

A person can print or hand-copy a secret's encrypted form and keep it where a finder could see it. A finder holds nothing until they guess the passphrase, and under Argon2id each guess costs memory as well as time. Krux's KEF format does this in a similar space under PBKDF2, which needs no memory; AQRV is the same idea under a memory-hard function.

CodeEnvelopeWhat it holds
25 × 2532 bytes, carried as text.A 12-word seed, or up to 15 bytes of text
29 × 2953 bytesUp to 32 bytes: a seed of up to 24 words, a codex32 string up to 192 bits, a passphrase or note, or a raw key
33 × 3362 bytesUp to 37 bytes: the same kinds, with a longer tag and room for a codex32 string up to 256 bits

What it holds, and what it is not

What it holds

  • A BIP-39 seed's entropy, as 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 words.
  • A codex32 string.
  • A BIP-39 passphrase.
  • A short note.
  • A raw 32-byte key.

The kind is not stored, so a code does not show which it holds, within a size. Not every kind fits every size.

What it is not

  • Not in Faraday's app.
  • Not reviewed. There is a Rust implementation by the same authors (a library, a command line and a desktop test app); no outside one.
  • Not a standard.
  • Not a way to make a weak passphrase safe: a photographed code can be attacked offline.
  • Not for devices without 64 MiB of memory.

How it compares

Against Krux's KEF.

AQRVKrux's KEF
Slow to guessYes: Argon2id, 64 MiB to 1 GiBNo memory cost: PBKDF2
Random saltYes: new for each codeNo: the id, by default the wallet's fingerprint
Nothing names the walletYesNo: the fingerprint is in the clear by default

KEF runs on microcontrollers and is in use, which AQRV is not. The full comparison is in AQRV.md, section 14. The vault page has all the forms side by side.

How long a passphrase holds

The time to try every passphrase of EFF's long word list, half that on average, for an attacker the size of a large data centre: a million CPU cores, about 16,000 servers of 64 cores, each core filling about 1 GiB of memory a second for Argon2, or doing about 225 SHA-256 compressions a second for KEF at its default 100,000 iterations. Holding the memory takes 64 TiB at 64 MiB and 1 PiB at 1 GiB. The times scale with the attacker: one with 1,000 cores, about 16 such servers, takes a thousand times as long, and one desktop computer of 16 cores about 65,000 times as long. A figure for scale, for today's hardware.

PassphraseBitsAQRV, 64 MiBAQRV, 256 MiBAQRV, 1 GiBKrux's KEF
3 words38.81 day4 days16 days45 minutes
4 words51.721 years83 years331 years241 days
5 words64.6160,000 years640,000 years2.6 million years5,100 years
6 words77.51.3 billion years5 billion years20 billion years40 million years

KEF's times count its compute only: it needs almost no memory, so graphics cards and dedicated hardware make it cheaper still, where Argon2's memory resists them. A passphrase a person makes up can be far weaker than any row. The figures and how they are worked out are in AQRV.md, section 12.

Downloads

A desktop test app and a command line, for Linux and Windows on x86-64, in one download for each. They are a test release: do not put a real secret in them.

Desktop test app and command line

The desktop app makes a code from a sample or data you type, opens a code or a .aqrv file with its passphrase, and shows what each memory setting costs. The command line, aqrv, does the same from a terminal: make, open and inspect a code, run the test vectors, and remake a code from a printed sheet's text.

Linux Windows

Checking the files

SHA256SUMS lists each file's SHA-256 and the commit it was built from. It is not signed: this is a test release, not a Faraday release.

sha256sum -c --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS

On Windows, PowerShell prints a file's sum to compare with its line in SHA256SUMS:

Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 .\Argon-QR-Vault-test-1-Windows.zip

Unpack the zip before running either program. Windows shows "Windows protected your PC" the first time, because the programs are not code-signed. Check the zip against SHA256SUMS, then choose More info, Run anyway.

SHA256SUMS The test release

How to help

Tested on 2026-11-11: the Rust library and a second reader by the same authors agreed on 13,413 generated and corrupted codes, and five fuzz targets ran 600 seconds each with no crash. Both readers are the same authors', so this is not an outside check. The results are in the vectors' README.

The implementation's README says how to build and use it, and the vectors' README how to run the checks.

Buy me a coffee

Donations to Faraday's development, in bitcoin.

QR code to come
Lightning
QR code to come
Bitcoin